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Abstract
This paper focuses on the choice of centralization of public policy in an
economy with two government levels. It argues that centralization by sub-
sidiarity principle stresses a con￿ icting interest between di⁄erent jurisdictions
instead of working it out. The extent of the con￿ ict of interest is a⁄ected
by spillovers and di⁄erences in public spending tastes. Spending decisions
are made by negotiation in the centralized legislature of local representa-
tives, unless they fail to reach an agreement. In the latter case, policy is
provided non-cooperatively by local governments. Results show that pooling
sovereignty by subsidiarity principle fails to fully internalize spillovers and
may produce misallocation of public resources.
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￿Pooling sovereignty means, in practice, that the member states delegate
some of their decision-making powers to shared institutions they have created,
so that decisions on speci￿c matters of joint interest can be made democrati-
cally at European level". (Europe, n.d.)
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1 Introduction
The fundamental principle of subsidiarity has largely driven the European discussion
about which competencies should be given to the European Community and which,
instead, retained for the member states alone. The subsidiarity principle applies to
those areas that do not fall within the exclusive competence of the European Union.
It states that the European Union will be in charge of providing a particular policy
if it cannot be su¢ ciently, or e¢ ciently, provided by the member states by either the
national or regional governments. The principle implies a bene￿t criterion stating
that the European provision of policies must bring added value over and above what
could be achieved by individual governments provision alone.
This paper develops a decision-making model in which two polities bargain the
delegation of their sovereignty upwards to a centralized inter-governmental insti-
tution. The model may be used to study policy formation in both national and
international federations as, for instance, the European Union. The aim is to inves-
tigate how the implementation of the subsidiarity principle in￿ uences the centralized
provision of policy. Results show that pooling sovereignty by subsidiarity principle
fails to fully internalize spillovers and may produce misallocation of public resources.
The paper focuses on the traditional issue raised by the classical ￿scal federalism
literature of what level of government should be responsible for taxing and spending.
It de￿nes a bargaining context in which independent jurisdictions conduct negotia-
tions in order to allocate power to provide policies to a common supra-jurisdictional
legislature. Thus, if member delegates reach agreement, then the centralized gov-
ernment implements policy uniformly across jurisdictions and levies a proportional
income tax to cover the cost. Conversely, if delegates do not come to agreement,
jurisdictional governments are free to provide policy at the decentralized level.1
Therefore, the centralized government chooses policy cooperatively, while the de-
centralized governments set policy competitively. Hence, the choice between cen-
tralized and decentralized provision implies a trade-o⁄ between cooperative and
competitive outcome which is a central issue in the process of pooling sovereignty.
In this framework, The decentralized provision of public goods may constrain the
centralized outcome leading to spillovers and di⁄erences in tastes for public spend-
ing generating a con￿ icting interest which a⁄ects the centralized formation of policy
decisions.
A major advantage of centralization occurs by the internalization of spillovers.2
As Besley and Coate (2003) explained, positive spillovers produce a situation in
1The common European defence policy, which o⁄ers potentially large e¢ ciency gains, provides
an example in which national governments implement policy separately because European states
fail to reach an agreement that would transfer this power to the EU. Here, a major cost of pooling
sovereignty regards the sacri￿ce of national powers and interests in favour of a common European
Policy. Bene￿ts from pooling sovereignty are produced by economics of scale, sharing costs and
internalizing spillovers. The case concerning a common European defence policy is well discussed
in Fontanel and Smith (1991).
2See Oates (1972), Besley and Coate (2003) and others.
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which, a policy implemented by a decentralized government bene￿ts the citizens of
the jurisdiction in which it is located, but also has bene￿cial e⁄ects on the citizens
of other jurisdictions. As a result, in the presence of spillovers, decentralized govern-
ments neglect bene￿ts going to other jurisdictions by under providing public goods
at the local level. Therefore, larger spillovers enhance cooperation at the centralized
level. Weyerstrass et al￿ s (2006) empirical assessment of the magnitude of economic
spillovers and welfare gains from economic policy coordination in the Euro Area
concludes that larger spillovers usually increase interdependence and cooperation in
the European Union.
This paper shows that the in￿ uence spillovers has on the decentralized outcome
also a⁄ects policy formation under the centralized system. In particular, the decen-
tralized outcome determines the relative bargaining power of the delegates involved
in the negotiation. Therefore, even if spillovers are internalized under centraliza-
tion, they have an noteworthy impact on centralized policy formation. As a result,
the representative of the jurisdiction that is in the position to bene￿t more from
spillovers in the decentralized outcome has more leverage and therefore more bar-
gaining power in the centralized policy formation. Of course, this phenomena is not
possible when the centralized government can make decisions without involving the
subsidiarity principle. This happens, for instance, when exclusive decision making
power is assigned to the centralized government by Constitution.
The starting point of this analysis is in the building up of a bargaining model
over centralization in a ￿scal federalism context. To do so, Giuranno￿ s (2005, 2008)
and Besley and Coate￿ s (2003) models are developed. Besley and Coate introduced a
political economy approach into Oates￿(1973) decentralization theory. They studied
the role of spillovers in the centralized versus decentralized provision of public goods.
Giuranno (2005, 2008) extended the working of the centralized legislature in Besley
and Coate (2003) by developing a bargaining approach in the legislature￿ s decision-
making process in order to study how inter-jurisdictional income inequality a⁄ects
the provision of public goods. This paper extends Giuranno￿ s framework in order
to represent the process of political integration, typical to many federations such as
the European Union.
Related literature. National constraints play an important role in the interna-
tional arena. International agreements, for example, must be rati￿ed by national
legislatures. Several models of international negotiations have shaped disagreements
over the so called Schelling conjecture (Schelling, 1960). This implies that negotia-
tors with the greatest domestic constraints hold an advantage during international
negotiations (Bailer and Schneider, 2006). Putnam (1988) has suggested that the
negotiation process can be broken down into two analytical stages: in the ￿rst stage,
bargaining takes place between negotiators at the international level; in the second
stage, national legislatures ratify or reject agreement. Putnam stated that nego-
tiators have to go back to their domestic constituents if they want negotiations to
succeed. Whereas Putnam￿ s theory inspired several bargaining models mainly based
on the application of Rubinstein￿ s (1982) alternating-o⁄er model (Mo, 1994; Lida,
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1993; Tarar, 2001), this paper builds on it to include national constraints in a Nash
cooperative bargaining framework. In our model, the disagreement utility for each
jurisdiction is equivalent to the welfare produced by the jurisdictional provision of
public goods, which would substitute the centralized provision in the case of dis-
agreement. Speci￿cally, we assume that the utility each jurisdiction receives from
the supra-jurisdictional implementation of policy must be greater than the welfare
produced by the jurisdictional provision as a necessary condition for rati￿cation of
agreement.
Stokman and Thomson (2004), Thomson et al (2006), and Schneider et al (2006)
support the choice of a cooperative bargaining model as a tool for our means. They
assessed the empirical relevance of alternative models of legislative decision-making
in the European Union. Their results ￿nd cooperative bargaining models, which
focus on the informal bargaining that takes place before the legislative proposals
are adopted as laws, generate more accurate forecasts of decision outcomes than
procedural models.
The paper is organized as follows. The next section de￿nes the framework and
reproduces some standard results concerning policy determination under decentral-
ization and the social optimum under centralization. Section three develops a model
of bargaining over centralization. Four presents the results and section ￿ve makes
conclusions. The appendix contains derivations and proofs.
2 The framework
We use a basic framework similar to that in Besley and Coate (2003). Consider
two independent equal sized jurisdictions or states comprising a federation. Each
jurisdiction has the same number of people with a mass of unity. There are two types
of goods in this economy, a public good g such as, for example, pollution control3
and a private good y, which we consider to be individual income or endowment that
is used for private consumption. Individual endowments y contribute to ￿nance the
public good. All citizens are endowed with the same income but have di⁄erent
tastes, ￿, regarding the public good. Therefore, jurisdictions are not homogeneous.
The parameter ￿ > 0 tells us how much a citizen prefers g with respect to y. Those
with higher ￿ value the public good more highly.
Jurisdictions are represented by their respective median voters. To simplify the
exposition, we assume that median voter 1 values public goods consumption less
than median voter 2, i.e. ￿1 < ￿2. Preferences for the median voter of jurisdiction
i are
y + ￿i [(1 ￿ k)lngi + k lng￿i], with i = 1;2. (1)
The parameter k 2 [0;1=2] measures the degree of spillovers; when k = 0 the median
voter only cares about the public good in his own jurisdiction, while when k = 1=2
he cares equally about the public good in both jurisdictions. Spillovers, k, are the
same for all citizens.
3Another example could be the degree of regulation and protection of ￿nancial markets.
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2.1 Policy determination at the decentralized level
The two jurisdictional median voters have to decide whether to provide a public
good jointly at a centralized level or independently at a decentralized level.4 Before
analyzing this trade-o⁄, we need to study what happens when jurisdictions do not
pool their sovereignty to the supra-jurisdictional legislature. In this case, jurisdic-
tional governments provide policy locally and ￿nance public expenditure by levying
a uniform head tax on jurisdictional residents. Thus, if jurisdiction i chooses a pub-
lic good level gi, each citizen in jurisdiction i pays a head tax of pgi, where p is the
public good price. Therefore, the budget constraint for jurisdiction i is5
tiy = pgi; with i = 1;2. (2)
Accordingly, the utility of median voter in jurisdiction i is
ui = y ￿ pgi + ￿i [(1 ￿ k)lngi + k lng￿i]. (3)
Note that @ui=@k = ￿i ln(g￿i=gi), which means that the marginal utility of
spillovers is zero when g1 = g2. In order to calculate g1 and g2, we assume that under
decentralization policy is chosen simultaneously and independently by jurisdictional
governments whose object is to maximize median voter￿ s surplus in the jurisdiction.
Accordingly, the tax rates (t1;t2) will form a Nash equilibrium. This requires that:












+ y (1 ￿ ti)
￿
, for i 2 f1;2g.
Taking ￿rst order conditions and solving yields:
(t1;t2) =
￿
￿1 (1 ￿ k)
y
;




Considering the equivalences tiy = pgi = ￿i (1 ￿ k), the public good levels are
(g1;g2) =
￿
￿1 (1 ￿ k)
p
;




Basically, local governments only take into account the bene￿ts received by citizens
in their own jurisdiction.
When tastes are homogeneous, i.e. ￿1 = ￿2, decentralized governments choose
the same level of public goods provision, which is lower the higher the spillovers.
4To clarify the notation, we refer to the decentralized government as either the jurisdictional or
the national level of government interchangeably. Similarly, we refer to the centralized legislature
as either the supra-national or inter-jurisdictional level of government interchangeably.
5Note that population is normalized to one and that all citizens bene￿t from the same level of
public good gi.
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Median voter 2, whose taste is higher than median voter 1, pays a higher tax rate
















After plugging in the correspondent values from (4) and (5), we get
u
D
i = y ￿ ￿i (1 ￿ k) + ￿i
￿
ln





















, with i = 1;2. (8)
Thus, we can state the following Lemma.
Lemma 1 Under decentralization, median voter 2￿ s utility always declines in k,
while median voter 1￿ s utility declines in k if ln
￿2
￿1 < k




















Lemma 1 states that median voter 2, who cares more than median voter 1 about
public goods provision, has a negative marginal bene￿t from spillovers; that is,
higher spillovers certainly make him worse o⁄. On the contrary, median voter 1 can
bene￿t from increased spillovers when the condition ln
￿2
￿1 ￿ k
1￿k < 0 is satis￿ed. In
the latter, the positive term ln
￿2
￿1 means that there is a positive marginal bene￿t
transfer in favour of median voter 1 when k increases because public goods provision
in jurisdiction 2 is higher. The ratio k
1￿k is the sum of two e⁄ects: one on the
decentralized tax rate, ti, and the second on public goods provision, gi. Accordingly,
an increase in k causes a bene￿t loss because gi is lower and consequently a tax-rate
reduction. Here, linearity in the cost leads to a negative marginal e⁄ect because the
marginal bene￿t declines more than the marginal cost, i.e. ￿ k
1￿k < 0. Thus, median
voter 1￿ s utility increases in k when the utility transfer in his favour, ln
￿2
￿1, is large






Furthermore, with spillovers, public goods are under-provided in both states
and this under-provision is increasing alongside an increase in spillovers.6 There is,
therefore, room for pooling sovereignty upwards to the centralized government.
6For a simple proof see Besley and Coate (2003).
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2.2 Policy determination under centralization
We assume that the centralized government ￿nances the public good uniformly
across countries by levying a proportional income-tax, t.7 Once the legislature
determines the tax rate t, the public good quantity is automatically determined by
the following relation or budget constraint8
pg = 2ty. (11)
Consequently, the tax rate is obtained by dividing the total pubic goods cost by
the total taxable income, t =
pg
2y, where the cost each individual h pays is ty =
pg
2 .
Thus, individual utility when policy is determined at the centralized level is
u





As expected, spillovers are fully internalized when policy is uniformly provided at
the centralized level.9
Thus, when policy is chosen by a benevolent central planner, the tax rate which
maximizes social welfare is te =
￿1+￿2
2y and the centralized public goods provision is
ge =
￿1+￿2
p , where ￿1 and ￿2 are average preference parameters in the two jurisdic-
tions.10
Now, we turn to the bargaining outcome to study how the centralized provision of
policy changes when jurisdictions pool their sovereignty by the subsidiarity principle.
3 Bargaining over centralization
The subsidiarity principle is a ￿ exible way to establish what level of government
should be responsible for taxing and spending. In this section, we study policy
formation when jurisdictions agree to delegate their decision-making power to the
centralized government. Basically, we assume that when the gains from pooling sov-
ereignty are positive for both jurisdictions, their representatives form a centralized
legislature and choose policy by bargaining. Here, in order to model the subsidiarity
7This is a fair representation the EU ￿nanzing, which is characterized by transfers from the
member states proportional to the states￿GNP. The EU also receives a proportion of the VAT
levied by the Member States.
8Note that the following relation hold: pg = t(2Ny), where 2Ny is total taxable income
obtained as the sum of individual incomes in the two jurisdictions and N is the population size,
which is assumed to have a mass of unity and to be the same in the two regions.
9Note that when policy is not uniformly provided by the central government, spillovers are only
partially internalized.
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principle, we proceed as follows. First, we assume that before bargaining takes place
in the centralized legislature, the status quo consists in the decentralized provision
of policy. Thus, if the centralized legislature does not reach an agreement, the status
quo will hold; that is, policy will be provided by the jurisdictional governments in-
dependently and simultaneously. This, in turn, implies that the disagreement utility
of median voter i, denoted with ud
i, is the utility median voter i receives from the
decentralized provision of policy. Accordingly, the disagreement utility for median
voter i is ud
i = uD
i , where uD
i is represented in equations (6) and (7) and depends
on the decentralized tax rates and policy levels de￿ned in equations (4) and (5).
Note that the disagreement utility de￿nes the median voters￿point of threat in the
bargaining situation. Recalling Lemma 1, the disagreement utility may increase in k
for median voter 1. In this circumstance, the threat point of median voter 1, which
de￿nes his or her bargaining power, is stronger the higher the degree of spillovers.
If an agreement is reached, policy is uniformly provided across jurisdictions and
spending is ￿nanced by a uniform head tax on all citizens. Therefore, following
equation (12), the agreement utility for median voter i is given by
ui = y ￿
pg
2
+ ￿i lng, with i = 1;2. (13)
Consequently, the net gain from pooling sovereignty to the centralized legislature,
denoted by  i = ui ￿ uD
i , is
 i = ￿i (1 ￿ k) ￿ ty + ￿i ln
2ty




> 0, with i = 1;2: (14)













leads to the following properties of the gain from pooling sovereignty, which are
stated in the following Lemma.
Lemma 2 The marginal net gain of spillovers from pooling sovereignty to the cen-
tralized legislature is always increasing in k for median voter 2, while for median
voter 1 it increases in k if ln
￿2
￿1 < k


















The lemma points out that the gain from pooling sovereignty to the centralized
level is not always increasing in spillovers for everyone. In particular, when a me-
dian voter has a negative marginal utility of spillovers the gain from cooperating is
increasing in the degree of spillovers. This is always the case for median voter 2.
Instead, for median voter 1 the gain from cooperating may decline when spillovers
increase. As shown in Lemma 1 this occurs when his or her marginal utility of
spillovers is positive, which means that median voter 1 can bene￿t from positive net
transfers from jurisdiction 2. Therefore, when median voter 1 has a positive mar-
ginal utility, an increase in spillovers decreases his or her gain from cooperating at
the centralized level. For this reason, median voter 1 gains more bargaining power
the higher the degree of spillovers.
Figure 1 gives a graphical representation of the bargaining game. The blue curves
represent the net gain for median voter 1 while the black curves show the net gain
for median voter 2. The broken-lines curves represent the changes in the net gains
when parameter k increases in the case in which ln
￿2
￿1 < k
1￿k. As we can see, median
voter 1 has the smallest gain from cooperating. Higher k reduces the interest in the
negotiation for median voter 1 and increases the distance between the two median
voters. The bargaining equilibrium must lie in the subset of feasible tax-rates in




1￿k, higher k reduces the subset of possible agreements.





￿1 (1 ￿ k) ￿ ty + ￿1 ln
2ty








￿2 (1 ￿ k) ￿ ty + ￿2 ln
2ty










￿1 (1 ￿ k) ￿ ty + ￿1 ln
2ty







￿2 (1 ￿ k) ￿ ty + ￿2 ln
2ty





Now, the ￿rst order condition can be written in an alternative form, which will
be very useful in the comparative statics. First, we need the following de￿nition:
De￿nition 1 De￿ne with ￿i =
@ i=@g
 i=g the elasticity of the gain from pooling sov-
ereignty to the centralized legislature for median voter i, with i = 1;2.
The elasticity measures the percent change of the gain from reaching an agree-
ment over policy relative to the percent change in the quantity, g, provided by the
centralized legislature. The ￿rst order condition can now be formulated as follows:
￿1 + ￿2 = 0. (20)
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The compromise characterizing the Nash bargaining equilibrium is one in which the
elasticities of the gains from pooling sovereignty of the two median voters are equal
in absolute value and take opposite signs: ￿1 = ￿￿2.
In the next section, we use the Nash bargaining ￿rst order condition to study
how changes in the degree of spillovers a⁄ect the equilibrium policy.
4 In￿ uence of spillovers on the centralized equilibrium pol-
icy
Median voters￿utility from the centralized provision of policy is represented by equa-
tion (13), which is not a⁄ected by spillovers. Basically, if sovereignty is assigned to
the centralized legislature by law or Constitution, spillovers can be fully internal-
ized by a uniform provision of policy. On the contrary, when the decision-making
power over a certain policy is assigned by subsidiarity, even if spillovers are centrally
internalized, they are not entirely wiped out under the centralized system. This is
shown in the following Lemma.
Lemma 3 In the centralized legislature, the tax rate t￿ increases when spillovers


























5 > 0. (21)
Proof. See Appendix.
Basically, spillovers in￿ uence policy when the subsidiarity principle is applied
because they shape median voters￿disagreement utility. Therefore, the decentralized
provision of public goods is still relevant under centralization because it determines
median voters￿bargaining strength in the centralized legislature. This can be seen
as a distortion produced by the subsidiarity principle if we compare this result with
the case in which local jurisdictions cannot in￿ uence the centralized decision-making
process.
Lemma 3 states that the centralized tax rate shifts to the same direction of
spillovers when a certain condition is satis￿ed. The following Proposition clari￿es
the result stated in Lemma 3 and provides insights as to who loses and who bene￿ts
from the presence of spillovers.
















The Proposition states that the centralized tax rate and consequent public goods
provision decrease when spillovers increase if condition ln
￿2
￿1 > k
1￿k is met. Now,
we know from Lemma (2) that this condition is satis￿ed when median voter 1 has
a negative marginal gain from cooperating in the centralized legislature. Similarly,
Lemma (1) states that the same condition is satis￿ed when median voter 1 has a
positive marginal utility from spillovers at the decentralized level. Therefore, when
median voter 1, who is the one who cares less about public goods provision, has
a positive marginal utility of spillovers, his or her gain from cooperating at the
supra-jurisdictional level declines when spillovers increase. This, in turn, implies
that median voter 1 gains more bargaining power the higher the degree of spillovers.
Hence, median voter 1 will be able to renegotiate a lower level of taxation when
spillovers are more relevant.
However, when condition ln
￿2
￿1 > k
1￿k is not satis￿ed, the prediction of policy
becomes ambiguous. In this case, marginal utility of spillovers is negative for both
median voters. Therefore, median voter 1 has no incentive to free-ride over median
voter 2 and cannot use this free-riding power as a threat in the negotiation. As
a result, both median voters have a positive marginal gain from centralizing when
spillovers increase. In this case, an increase in k declines public goods provision at
the decentralized level in both jurisdictions. This, in turn, will a⁄ect median voters￿
bargaining strength or threat point. Whether these changes are more favorable
to one median voter or the other depends on the particular values of the given
parameters. Therefore, if the bargaining threat point changes more in favour of
median voter 1, who wants less public goods provision in equilibrium, then tax rate
t￿ will decrease. Similarly, if the threat point changes in favour of median voter
2, who would like more public spending in equilibrium, then t￿ will increase as k
increases.
5 Conclusion
The trade-o⁄between centralized versus decentralized provision of public goods has
long been of interest to public economists. The standard approach suggests that
a main asset of centralizing public spending is in the internalization of spillovers.
This analysis has o⁄ered a di⁄erent perspective in which spillovers are not fully
internalized when the subsidiarity principle is adopted in the centralization process.
Subsidiarity is a ￿ exible way to decide what level of government should be respon-
sible for providing a speci￿c policy. It works in either direction: upwards, from
decentralized towards the centralized legislature, or downwards. In particular here
we focus on the case in which decentralized jurisdictions pool their decision-making
power upwards as, for example, in the case of the European Union.
This paper shows that there is a relevant drawback of centralization when the
subsidiarity principle applies. In particular, we have seen that higher spillovers
lower public goods provision when a jurisdiction is in the position to gain "free-
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riding power". In order to show this, we have replaced the central planner in
the traditional utilitarian approach with a bargaining approach between jurisdic-
tional representatives coupled with the principle of subsidiarity. We have found
that changes in spillovers have signi￿cant e⁄ects on the centralized policy outcome,
which cannot be captured by the traditional central planner. On the contrary, cen-
tralization without the subsidiarity principle, for example by Constitution, is able
to eliminate the free-riding problem and the consequent policy distortion.
Under the subsidiary principle regime, centralized government holds the power to
set policy only as long as jurisdictions obtain mutual gains from the joint provision
of public goods. As a consequence, when jurisdictions cannot reach an agreement
over policy in the centralized legislature, they will provide it at the decentralized
level. In this way, the choice of centralization versus decentralization implies a
trade-o⁄ between centralized cooperation versus decentralized competition. As is
widely accepted in the ￿scal federalism literature, inter-jurisdictional competition
leads to under-provision because jurisdictions can bene￿t from the provision of their
neighbours. Furthermore, under decentralization, di⁄erences in tastes for public
spending may lead to a distorted situation in which public consumption in the ju-
risdiction with positive marginal utility from spillovers is partially subsidised by
the jurisdiction with negative marginal utility. Accordingly, the jurisdiction with
positive marginal utility gains more bargaining power in the centralized negotia-
tion the larger the spillovers. In particular, this bargaining power takes the form
of a "free-riding threat". Basically, the gain from centralizing public good provi-
sion may be either increasing or decreasing in the degree of spillovers. Therefore, if
for a jurisdiction, decentralized marginal utility increases in spillovers, then higher
spillovers decrease its net gain from cooperating. As a result, this jurisdiction is in
the position to a⁄ect policy more successfully under the threat of abandoning the
negotiation and free-ride at the decentralized level if an agreement is not achieved.
In our model, decentralized marginal utility of spillovers is positive for the jurisdic-
tion that wants less public goods provision. As a result, an increase in the degree
of spillovers leads to a decrease of public goods provision at the centralized level.
This is in contrast with the case in which sovereignty is pooled to the centralized
legislature by Constitution. In this case, decentralized provision cannot a⁄ect the
centralized negotiation because central government has the exclusive ruling power
over policy. Consequently, spillovers cannot generate con￿ icting interests in the
centralized policy formation because the free-riding threat is eliminated.
Likewise, the outcome of this paper cannot be replicated by using the classical
utilitarian approach because the central planner does not take into account juris-
dictions￿con￿ icting interests. Under uniform provision, the central planner would
rather fully internalize spillovers and would not change policy because the magni-
tude of spillovers changes. A main di⁄erence between bargaining and the central
planner approach is that in the bargaining model jurisdictional representatives use
their bargaining power to gain a larger share of joint surplus.
Pooling sovereignty upwards by subsidiarity may increase social welfare, but may
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not be able to avoid free-riding since it fails to fully internalize spillovers under uni-
form provision. Therefore, when there is room for free-riding, cooperation declines
in spillovers instead of increasing. In this circumstance, the subsidiarity principle
may not be the best way to pool sovereignty to the centralized legislature.
This paper provides a political economic framework which can be used for sev-
eral future developments. Most classical literature on intergovernmental relations,
which is based on the traditional central planner approach, can be reinterpreted in
a bargaining framework. For instance, a simple development would be to study the
centralized provision of policy when public goods are not uniformly provided. Simi-
larly, the model can be extended to study how the usual intergovernmental con￿ icts
can be solved when policy is implemented by both levels of government, centralized
and decentralized, either simultaneously or in a stackelberger type model. Further-
more, a possible application of this framework could be the analysis of international
negotiations in the structure and regulation of ￿nancial and other types of markets.
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6 Appendix
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5 S 0. (25)
Since the sign of Gt is negative, the comparative statics takes the sign of Gk. This
proves the Proposition.
Proof of Proposition 1. We know from the analysis of equilibrium equation
(20) that the elasticity of the net gain is negative for median voter 1 and positive for
median voter 2. This, in turn, implies that in condition (21)
￿1
t is negative. It is also


































< 0. This proves the Proposition.
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Figure 1: Solid lines: k = 0:1 and ln
￿2
￿1 > k




￿1 = 1, ￿2 = 2 and y = 10.
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